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ABSTRACT
Federated learning has emerged as a promising approach for collab-
orative and privacy-preserving learning. Participants in a federated
learning process cooperatively train a model by exchanging model
parameters instead of the actual training data, which they might
want to keep private. However, parameter interaction and the re-
sulting model still might disclose information about the training
data used. To address these privacy concerns, several approaches
have been proposed based on differential privacy and secure mul-
tiparty computation (SMC), among others. They often result in
large communication overhead and slow training time. In this pa-
per, we propose HybridAlpha, an approach for privacy-preserving
federated learning employing an SMC protocol based on functional
encryption. This protocol is simple, efficient and resilient to par-
ticipants dropping out. We evaluate our approach regarding the
training time and data volume exchanged using a federated learning
process to train a CNN on the MNIST data set. Evaluation against
existing crypto-based SMC solutions shows that HybridAlpha can
reduce the training time by 68% and data transfer volume by 92% on
average while providing the same model performance and privacy
guarantees as the existing solutions.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security andprivacy→Privacy-preserving protocols; •Com-
puting methodologies → Distributed artificial intelligence;
Neural networks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning (ML) has been widely applied in industry and
academia to a wide variety of domains [23, 26]. While traditional
ML approaches depend on a centrally managed training data set, pri-
vacy considerations drive interest in decentralized learning frame-
works in which multiple participants collaborate to train a ML
model without sharing their respective training data sets. Feder-
ated learning (FL) [25, 28] has been proposed as a decentralized
process that can scale to thousands of participants. Since the train-
ing data does not leave each participant’s domain, FL is suitable for
use cases that are sensitive to data sharing. This includes health
care, financial services and other scenarios of particular privacy
sensitivity or subject to regulatory mandates.
In FL, each participant trains a model locally and exchanges
only model parameters with others, instead of the active privacy-
sensitive training data. An entity called aggregator merges the
model parameters of different participants. Often, an aggregator is
a central entity that also redistributes the merged model parameters
to all participants but other topologies have been used as well, e.g.,
co-locating an aggregator with each participant. However, this
approach still poses privacy risks: inference attacks in the learning
phase have been proposed by [30]; deriving private information
from a trained model has been demonstrated in [37]; and a model
inversion attack has been presented in [19].
To address such privacy leakage, differential privacy [15, 17]
has been proposed for a learning framework [1, 31], in which a
trusted aggregator controls the privacy exposure to protect the
privacy of the model’s output. Similarly, [32] proposes to combine
differential privacy techniques and secure multiparty computation
(SMC) to support privacy-preserving analyses on private data from
different data providers, whereas [6] combines secret sharing and
authenticated encryption in a failure-robust protocol for secure
aggregation of high-dimensional data.
Inspired from the hybrid methodology [32], a recent paper [38]
also proposed a hybrid solution that provides strong privacy guar-
antees while still enabling good model performance. This hybrid
approach combines a noise-reduction differential privacy approach
with protection of SMC protocol, where the underlying security
cornerstone is additive homomorphic encryption, i.e., threshold
Paillier system [11]. Even though the hybrid approach has good
model performance and privacy guarantees, it comes with long
training time and high data transmission cost and cannot deal with
participants dropping out during the FL process. In Table 1, we
summarize existing privacy-preserving approaches from the per-
spectives of threat model, privacy guarantees, and offered features.
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We believe a privacy-preserving FL framework should strive for
strong privacy guarantees, high communication efficiency, and re-
silience to changes. As shown by Table 1, approaches that offer
privacy guarantees incur a large number of communication rounds,
substantially increasing the training time for FL systems.
To address the above-mentioned challenges, we propose Hybri-
dAlpha, an efficient approach for privacy-preserving FL. HybridAl-
pha employs functional encryption to perform SMC. Using functional
encryption, we define a simple and efficient privacy-preserving FL
approach, which also supports a participant group that is changing
during the course of the learning process. We summarize our key
contributions as follows:
• We propose HybridAlpha, an efficient privacy-preserving FL
approach that employs a differential privacy mechanism and
defines a SMC protocol from amulti-input functional encryp-
tion scheme. We adapt such scheme and include additional
provisions to mitigate the risk that curious aggregators and
colluding participants will infer private information.
• We implement and compare - both theoretically and experi-
mentally - a functional encryption scheme to common, tradi-
tional cryptography schemes such as additive homomorphic
encryption and its variants, which are typically used for
SMC. Our benchmark results will guide future adoption of
these cryptosystems in the selection of adequate SMCs for
FL.
• We describe an implementation of theHybridAlpha approach
and apply it to a convolutional neural network. The exper-
imental results on the MNIST dataset show that our Hy-
bridAlpha framework has efficiency improvements both in
training time and communication cost, while providing the
same model performance and privacy guarantee as other
approaches.
• At the same time, we demonstrate a solution to the dynamic
participant group issue, which indicates that our proposed
framework is robust to participants’ dropout or addition.
We also analyze the security and privacy guarantee of the
HybridAlpha framework under our defined threat model
within a trusted TPA, honest-but-curious aggregators, and
partially dishonest participants.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first approach for privacy-
preserving federated learning that demonstrates how to make
use of functional encryption to prevent certain inference attacks
that would be possible by naively applying this cryptosystem. We
demonstrate that our approach has better model performance,
stronger privacy guarantee, lower training time and more efficient
communication compared to existing solutions.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
§2, we introduce background and preliminaries. We propose our
HyrbidAlpha framework and its underlying threat model in §3.
The evaluation, as well as the security and privacy analysis are
respectively presented in §4 and §5. We discuss related works in
§6 and conclude the paper in §7.
2 BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the background and explain the un-
derlying building blocks of our proposed framework.
2.1 Privacy Preserving Federated Learning
The first FL design aimed to protect the data privacy by ensuring
each participant would keep its data locally and uniquely transmit
model parameters [28]. Although at first glance it may provide
some level of privacy, attacks in the literature have demonstrated
that it is possible to infer private information [19, 30, 37]. To fully
protect the privacy of the training data from inference attacks, it is
necessary to provide the privacy of the computation and the output.
Privacy of computation. Malicious participants involved in FL
training may have an incentive to infer private information of
others. Messages exchanged with the aggregator contain model
updates that leak private information. For instance, if a bag of words
is used as embedding to train a text-based classifier, inspecting
gradients can help an adversary identify what words where used
(e.g., non-zero gradients constitute words used). SMC protocols
can be used to protect inference attacks at training time. These
protocols ensure that individual results cannot be exposed while
still allowing the computation of aggregated data.
Privacy of output. Machine learning models can also leak private
information about the training data [19, 30, 37]. Here, adversaries
can repeatedly query the model to identify if a particular observa-
tion was part of the training data. To prevent against these attacks,
differential privacy has been proposed. In this case, noise is added
to the model to protect individual records in the training dataset.
Existing approaches. Table 1 presents an overview of privacy
preserving approaches (a more thorough description is presented
in §6). Although some of them provide privacy guarantees for
the computation and output, they lack relevant features for FL
systems. In particular, approaches that increase the number of
communication rounds can hinder the applicability of FL, as they
augment the training time and amount of data exchanged. For large
models such as neural networks, this is a major concern.
Another important feature should be provided by FL frameworks
is the support for dynamic participation. In some scenarios, partici-
pants may leave the training process at any time, we refer to these
as dropouts. As shown in Table 1, existing approaches cannot grace-
fully deal with dropouts and require re-doing an overall training
round with new keys. New participants may also join the training
process at any time. Existing approaches do not provide support
for this dynamic flow and require full-re-keying.
Our proposed HybridAlpha reduces significantly the training
time by limiting the number of messages exchanged to one by round
- substantially less than existing approaches that offer privacy of
computation. In what follows, we present in detail some of the basic
building blocks that allow us to achieve this result.
2.2 Differential Privacy and Multiparty
Computation
Differential privacy (DP) [15, 17] is a rigorous mathematical frame-
work where an algorithm may be described as differentially private
if and only if the inclusion of a single instance in the training dataset
causes only statistically insignificant changes to the algorithm’s
output. The formal definition for DP is as follows:
Definition 2.1. (Differential Privacy [15]). A randomized func-
tion K gives (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy if for all data sets D and D′
Table 1: Comparison of privacy-preserving approaches in federated machine learning framework
Threat Model Privacy Guarantee SMC Features
Proposed Approach participant aggregator computation output type ∗ communication † dynamic participants
Shokri and Shmatikov[36] honest honest ✗ ✓ − 1 round ✓
PATE [31] honest honest ✗ ✓ − 1 round −
PySyft [34] honest HbC⋄ ✓ ✓ HE 2 rounds‡ −
Bonawitz et al. [6] dishonest HbC⋄ ✓ ✓ SS+AE 3 rounds‡ dropout
Truex et al. [38] dishonest HbC⋄ ✓ ✓ TP 3 rounds‡ ✗
HybridAlpha (our work) dishonest HbC⋄ ✓ ✓ FE 1 round‡ dropout + addition
∗ “SS+AE”represents secret sharing techniques with key agreement protocol and authenticated encryption scheme; “HE” is homomorphic encryption scheme; “TP” is
Threshold-Paillier system, a partially additive homomorphic encryption scheme; “FE” indicates functional encryption scheme; symbol − indicates non-comparative option.
⋄ HbC is the abbreviation of Honest but Curious.
† The count is based on one epoch at the training phase between the aggregator and the participant.
‡ The key distribution communication is not covered here.
differing on at most one element, and all S ⊆ Range(K),
Pr[K(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp (ϵ) · Pr[K(D′) ∈ S] + δ .
The probability is taken over the coin tosses of K .
Note that ϵ-differential privacy can be treated as a special case
of (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy where δ = 0. To achieve DP, multi-
ple mechanisms designed to inject noise to the algorithm’s out-
put have been proposed. These mechanisms add noise propor-
tional to the sensitivity of the output, a measure of the maximum
change of the output resulting by the inclusion of a single data
point. Popular mechanisms include Laplacian and Gaussian mecha-
nisms, where the Gaussian mechanism for a dataset D is defined
asM(D) = f (D) + N (0, S2f σ 2), where N (0, S2f σ 2) is the normal dis-
tribution with mean 0 and standard deviation Sf σ . By applying
the Gaussian mechanism to function f with sensitivity Sf satisfies
(ϵ,δ )-differential privacy [16].
Noise Reduction through SMC. SMC allows multiple parties
to compute a function over their inputs, without revealing their
individual inputs [5, 10]. SMC can be achieved using different tech-
niques such as garbled circuit with oblivious transfer, fully or par-
tially homomorphic encryption, and functional encryption.
Prior work has shown that it is possible to maintain the same
DP guarantee achieved by local differential privacy [24, 33], i.e.,
each party adds its own noise independently, and uses SMC to
hide individual inputs. Concretely, using the Gaussian mechanism
defined above, local differential privacy requires each participant
to independently add N (0, S2f σ 2). Considering n parties, the total
noise adds up to n. However, when applying SMC each participant
can add a fraction of the noise N (0, 1n S2σ 2) and then use a SMC
technique to share the value for aggregation. As shown in [38], this
ensures the same DP guarantee while reducing the amount of total
noise injected by a factor of n.
2.3 Functional Encryption
HybridAlpha relies on Functional Encryption (FE), a public-key
cryptosystem that allows parties to encrypt their data, meanwhile,
an external entity can compute a specific function on the ciphertext
without learning anything additional from the underlying plaintext
data [8]. For this purpose, a trusted third party (TPA) is used to set
up a master private key and a master public key that will be used
to derive multiple public keys to one or more parties who intend
to encrypt their data. Given a function f (·), a functional private
key skf will be generated by the TPA who holds a master secret
key. By processing the function related key skf a decryptor can
compute fskf (x) from the encrypted data, enc(x), without revealing
the plaintext x .
To satisfy the distributed setting, a variant of functional encryp-
tion, i.e., Multi-Input Functional Encryption (MIFE) is proposed in
[20], where a functional secret key skf can correspond to an n-ary
function f (·) that takes multiple ciphertexts as input. In our feder-
ated machine learning framework, we adopt with modifications the
MIFE scheme for inner-product proposed in [2, §4.4] due to its com-
putational efficiency. Unlike other FE schemes, this construction
provides a construction that does not require performance intensive
pairing operations, and hence reduces the overall run-time.
We now present our construction of a MIFE scheme for federated
learning, which derived from the construction in [2, §4.4] whose
security relies on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption.
This MIFE scheme relies on five algorithms, Setup, PKDistribute,
SKGenerate, Encrypt,Decrypt, and three roles: the third party author-
ity (TPA), participants and aggregators. Algorithms Setup, PKDis-
tribute, SKGenerate are run by TPA. Each participant runs Encrypt
algorithm to encrypt their model parameters and the aggregator
runs Decrypt algorithm to acquires the average sum of encrypted
model parameters. Notice that comparing to the MIFE construction
in [2], we add an additional algorithm, i.e., PKDistribute, to help
deliver the public keys pk to participants. As a result, each partici-
pant will encrypt their data using its own pk rather than using the
master key msk as described in [2]. This modification is beneficial
because different parties do not need to share a single master key.
Suppose the inner-product functionality is defined as follows:
f ((x1,x2, ...,xn ),y) =
n∑
i=1
ηi∑
j=1
(xi jy∑i−1
k=1 ηk+j
) s .t .|y| =
n∑
i=1
ηi ,
where n denotes the total number of input sources, ηi is the length
of each input vector xi , and dimension(y) = ∑ni=1 dimension(xi )
The specific construction of MIFE is defined follows:
• Setup(1λ ,F ®ηn ): The algorithm first generates secure parame-
ters as G := (G,p,д) ← GroupGen(1λ), and then generates
several samples as a ←R Zp , a := (1,a)⊺ , ∀i ∈ {1, ...,n} :
Wi ←R Zηi×2p , ui ←R Zηip . Then, it generates the master
public key and master private key as
mpk := (G, [a]1, [Wa]), msk := (W, (ui )i ∈{1, ...,n }).
• PKDistribute(mpk,msk, idi ): It looks up the existing keys
via idi and returns the public key aspki := (G, [a], (Wa)i ,ui ).
• SKGenerate(mpk,msk,y): The algorithm first partitions y
into (y1 | |y2 | |...| |yn ), where |yi | is equal to ηi . Then it gen-
erates the function derived key as
skf ,y := ((d⊺i ) ← (y
⊺
i Wi ), z ←
∑
(y⊺i ui )).
• Encrypt(pki ,xi ): The algorithm first generates a random
nonce ri ←R Zp , and then computes the ciphertext as
cti := ([ti ] ← [ari ], [ci ] ← [xi + ui +Wairi ]).
• Decrypt(ct, skf ,y): The algorithm first calculates as follows:
C :=
∏
i ∈[n]([y⊺i ci ]/[d
⊺
i ti ])
z
,
and then recovers the function result as f ((x1,x2, ...,xn ),y) =
logд(C).
Note that in the federated learning setting, the aggregator holds the
vector y, and each ηi is set as 1, which indicates the input from each
participant is a single element instead of the vector as described in
the MIFE scheme.
3 HYBRID-ALPHA FRAMEWORK
In this section, we present the specific construction of our Hybri-
dAlpha framework for privacy-preserving federated learning. Our
framework prevents inference attacks from curious aggregators
and limits the inference power of colluding participants, as detailed
later in the threat model.
Figure 1 presents an overview of HybridAlpha. Participants want
to collaboratively learn a machine learning model without sharing
their local data with any other entity in the system. They agree on
sharing only model updates with an aggregator. This entity is in
charge of receiving model updates from multiple participants to
build a common machine learning model.
Participants want to protect their data against any inference
attack during the FL process and from the final model. For this pur-
pose, they join a HybridAlpha, which has a Third Party Authority
(TPA). This entity provides a key management service that initiates
the cryptosystem and provides functional encryption keys to all
parties. To prevent potential leakage of information, HybridAlpha
also includes an Inference Prevention Module that limits what type of
functional encryption keys are provided. This module is designed
to ensure that decryption keys cannot be obtained by curious ag-
gregators and to limit potential collusion attacks. We detail this
module in §3.2.2.
3.1 Threat Model
We consider the following threat model:
1Note that [x ] = дx . Here we implicitly adopt the bracket notation from [18], which
is somewhat standard in the crypto community.
• Honest-but-curious aggregator : We assume that the aggrega-
tor correctly follows the algorithm and protocols, but may
try to learn private information inspecting themodel updates
sent by the participants in the process. This is a common
assumption [6, 38].
• Curious and colluding participants: We assume that partici-
pants may collude to try to acquire private information from
other participants by inspecting the messages exchanged
with the aggregator or the final model.
• Trusted TPA: This entity is an independent agency which
is widely trusted by the participants and the aggregator. In
real scenarios, different sectors of the economy already have
entities that can take such role. For instance, in the banking
industry, central banks often play a fully trusted role, and in
other sectors, a third company such as a service or consultant
firm can embody the TPA. We also note that assuming such
trusted and independent agency is a common assumption
in existing cryptosystems that have employed the TPA as
the underlying infrastructure [7, 8, 21]. The TPA is in charge
of holding the master private and public key. The TPA is
also trusted to perform public key distribution and function
derived secret key generation. Similarly, Inference Prevention
Module is fully trusted.
We assume that secure channels are used in all communications,
thus, man-in-the-middle and trivial snooping attacks are prevented.
We also assume a secure key-provisioning procedure such as Diffie-
Hellman is in place to protect key confidentiality. Finally, attacks
that aim to create denial of service attacks or inject malicious model
updates are beyond the scope of this paper.
Based on the threatmodel above, our proposed privacy-preserving
framework can ensure that (i) the semi-honest aggregator cannot
learn additional information except for the expected output by the
differential privacy mechanism, and (ii) the malicious colluding par-
ticipants cannot learn the parameters of other honest participants.
The specific security and privacy analysis are presented in §5.
3.2 HybridAlpha Detailed Operations
We now describe in detail the operations of HybridAlpha and begin
by introducing the notation used. Let A be the aggregator and SP
be a set of n participants, where each participant Pi holds its own
datasetDi . We denote as LFL the learning algorithm to be trained.
In this section, we first introduce the operations of the frame-
work for non-adversarial settings, and then explain how additional
features are used to protect against the inference attacks defined in
the threat model section.
3.2.1 Non-adversarial setting. HybridAlpha’s operations under non-
adversarial settings are indicated in Algorithm 1. As input, Hybri-
dAlpha takes the set of participants, the algorithm used for training,
and the differential privacy parameter ϵ .
HybridAlpha initiates via the TPA setting up keys in the system.
In particular, the TPA runs the Setup and PKDistribute algorithms
presented in §2.3, so that each participant Pi has its own public key
pki (lines 1-5). We note that HybridAlpha allows new participants
to join the training process even if it has already started. To achieve
this, the TPA provisions a larger number of keys than the initial
set of participants (line 2). In this way, when new participants join
Figure 1: Framework overview of our proposed efficient approach for privacy-preserving federated learning. Note that we only
present one epoch here. Each participant does the local training based on their owned dataset, and then sends out the model
parameters using our proposed efficient privacy-preserving approach.
Algorithm 1: HybridAlpha
Input: LFL := Machine learning algorithms to be trained;
ϵ := privacy guarantee; SP := set of participants, where
Pi ∈ SP holds its own dataset Di ; N := maximum number of
expected participants; t := minimum number of aggregated
replies
Output: Trained global modelM
1 function TPA-initialization(1λ ,N ,SP )
2 mpk,msk← MIFE.Setup(1λ ,F 1N ) s.t. N ≫ |SP |;
3 foreach Pi ∈ SP do
4 pki ← MIFE.PKDistribute(mpk,msk,Pi );
5 end
6 function aggregate(LFL ,SP , t )
7 foreach Pi ∈ SP do
8 asynchronously query Pi with msgq,i = (LFL , |SP |) ;
9 end
10 do
11 Smsgrecv ← collect participant response msgr,i ;
12 while |Smsgrecv | ≥ t and still in max waiting time;
13 if |Smsgrecv | ≥ t then
14 specifywP vector; request the skf ,wP from TPA;
15 M ← MIFE.Decrypt(skf ,wP ,wP ,Smsgrecv );
16 end
17 returnM
18 function participant-train(ϵ, t ,msgq,i ,Di , pki )
19 Mi ← LFL(Di );
20 MDPi ← DP(ϵ,Mi , t);
21 msgr,i ← MIFE.Encrypt(MDPi ,pki );
22 sends msgr,i to aggregator;
the training process, they need to acquire the individual public key
from the TPA, and then participate in the learning protocol; all this
without requiring any changes for other participants.
To begin the learning process, the aggregatorA asynchronously
queries each participant Pi with a query to train the specified
learning algorithm LFL and the number of participant. Then, the
aggregator collects the responses of each party Pi (lines 7-12).
When all responses are received, assuming there is quorum, A
needs to request a key from the TPA corresponding to the weighted
vectorwp that will be used to compute the inner product. That is,
the aggregator requests private key skf ,wp from the TPA based on
wp . For computation of average cumulative sum of each partici-
pant’s model, wp can be set as wp = ( 1n , 1n , ..., 1n ) s .t . |wp | = n,
where n is the number of received responses. Then, A updates the
global modelM by applying the decryption algorithm of the MIFE
cryptosystem on collected ciphertext set Smsgrecv and skf ,wp . Note
that here we assume the aggregator A will get all responses from
every participant. In the case of dropouts, n can be changed so that
it reflects the number of participants that are being aggregated. In
the next subsection, we show how HybridAlpha provides recom-
mendations to set up t so that the number of allowed dropouts are
limited for security reasons.
At the participant side, when a query for training is received
by participant Pi , it trains a local modelMi using its dataset Di .
During the training process2, the participant adds differential pri-
vacy noise to the model parameters according to the procedure
presented in §2.2. Finally, Pi encrypts the resulting noisy model
using the MIFE encryption algorithm and sends it to the aggregator
(lines 18-22).
3.2.2 Inference Prevention Module. In our threat model, we assume
an honest-but-curious aggregator that tries to infer private infor-
mation during the training process. We consider multiple potential
attacks where the aggregator manipulates the weighted vector to
perform inference.
In particular, suppose that A wants to infer the model of Pi . A
can try to launch an inference attack to obtain the model updates
of participant k by setting the weighted vector as follow:
∀k ∈ {1, ...,n} : w′p =
(
wpk = 1, if k = i
wpk = 0, if k , i
)
If a malicious aggregator is allowed a key to perform the inner
product of this vector with the model updates, the model updates
of target user k would become visible; this follows because w ′p
zeros-out the model updates of all other participants except for the
2The differential privacy mechanism depends on the machine learning model being
trained. For simplicity, in Algorithm 1 we show the noise added after the training
process takes place. However, we note that some DP mechanisms add noise during
the training process e.g., to train a neural network with the DP mechanism in [1]
ones sent by target participant k . If this is not avoided, A would
acquirewi + 1nN (0, S2σ 2) as the decryption result of the MIFE cryp-
tosystem. Here, the reduced noise 1nN (0, S2σ 2) does not provide
the expected privacy guarantee to protectMi of Pi because each
honest participant is injecting noise, assuming its model update is
aggregated privately with other n participants.
An honest but curious aggregator may also try to create a smaller
weighted vector to exclude a subset of participants from the aggre-
gation process. In the worst case, the malicious aggregator would
try to shrink the weighted vector to include one single participant
to uniquely “aggregate” the model updates of that participant.
Following this same attack vector, a malicious aggregator collud-
ing with dishonest participants may try to build awp vector such
that: (i) a target participant model update is included in the vectors;
(ii) all other honest participants model updates are not aggregated,
and (iii) updates of dishonest participants are included in the aggre-
gation process. Since the aggregator is colluding with the dishonest
participants included in the aggregation process and only the target
participant is included in the aggregation, the model update of the
target participant is easily reconstructed (its the single unknown
variable in the average equation).
To prevent such inference attacks, we propose an additional
component called Inference Prevention Module collocated with the
TPA. This module intercepts and inspects requests for private keys
for given weighted vectors to prevent a curious aggregator from
obtaining a key that will allow for an inference-enabling inner
product.
To this end, the Inference Prevention Module takes as input a pa-
rameter t that defines a threshold on the number of non-colluding
participants, where t ≥ n2 + 1, that is more than half of the par-
ticipants should not be colluding. By running Algorithm 2 and
using parameter t , it is possible to prevent the attacks previously
described. In particular, the Inference Module enforces that keys
are only provided to weighted vectors that have at least t non-zero
elements and that the weight for each included model update is the
same.
Threshold t has an impact on the number of dropouts allowed
by the system. Mainly, it helps set up the minimum quorum of
participants replying to the system. HybridAlpha allows a limited
number of participants to dropout without requiring any re-keying;
only the weighted vector sent by the aggregator needs to be updated
by uniquely including the weights of model updates received.
We also note that t has an impact on how much differential
privacy noise is added by each participant to achieve a pre-defined
ϵ . Concretely, the number of aggregated replies is always at least t ,
so as explain in §2.2, the noise can be adapted to always account
for t non-colluding participants contributing to the average, e.g.,
N (0, 1t S2σ 2). For this purpose, t needs to be communicated among
all participants and the aggregator.
UnderlyingMLmodels ofHybridAlpha. For simplicity we only
use the neural networks as the underlying ML model in our FL
framework for illustration and evaluation, however, the our Hybri-
dAlpha supports various ML algorithms. As functional encryption
enables the computation of any inner-product based operation, any
model that can be trained through a stochastic gradient descent
Algorithm 2: Inference prevention filter
Input: wp :=A weighted vector to be inspected for inference
attacks; t := threshold of minimum number of dropouts
and expected number of non-colluding participants
1 function inference-prevention-filter(wp , t )
2 cnz ← count the non-zero element in wp ;
3 if cnz < t then return "invalidwp " ;
4 foreach non-zerowpi ∈ wp do
5 if wpi , 1cnz then return "invalidwp ";
6 end
7 forward wp to the TPA;
(SGD)-based algorithm can be trained via our proposed HybridAl-
pha; models in this pool include SVMs, logistic regression, linear
regression, Lasso, and neural networks, among others. Othermodels
such as decision trees and random forests which require aggregat-
ing counts from each participant can also be trained by considering
the counts sent to the aggregator as a vector.
4 EVALUATION
In this section we perform a detailed evaluation of our proposed
approach to answer the following questions:
• How does HybridAlpha perform theoretically when com-
pared to existing techniques that have similar threat models?
More specifically, how many crypto-related operations can
be reduced by using HybridAlpha?
• How does our proposed SMC perform under benchmarking?
How does precision setting impact computation time com-
pared with existing techniques? What impact do different
numbers of participants have?
• How does HybridAlpha compare to existing techniques in
terms of performance efficiency?
4.1 Baselines and Theoretical Analysis
We compare the proposed HybridAlpha with two state of the art
private-federated learning approaches: [38] and [34], which use
different SMC techniques. A graphical overview and comparison
of these baselines can be found in Figure 2, the steps performed by
each approach are defined in this figure. We will use this notation
to report our results. Additionally, we provide a brief description
of our baselines:
• We refer to the first baseline as TP-SMC [38]. This FL ap-
proach uses a threshold-based homomorphic cryptosystem
that allows for a trusted parameter t that specifies the num-
ber of participants that are trusted not to collude.
• We refer as P-SMC to our second baseline which is inspired
by PySyft [34], an opensource system that uses SPDZ pro-
tocol [12, 13]. This construct supports homomorphic addi-
tion and multiplication. Because the SGD aggregation only
requires addition, we opted for a additive homomorphic ap-
proach for the comparison, thus, the results reported for this
baseline are representative yet faster than PySyft.
We note that the contrasted approaches follows a similar threat
model to [38] with a honest-but-curious aggregator, and potentially
Figure 2: Illustration of aggregation via different crypto-based SMC solutions.
Table 2: The number of crypto-related operations required
for each solution.
Communication TP-SMC P-SMC HybridAlpha ∗
Step (1) n n n +m
Step (3) n ×m n ×m n ×m
Step (5) m × t n ×m -
Step (7) t ×m - -
TOTAL 2mt +mn + n 2mn + n mn +m + n
colluding and malicious participants. However, they differ in the
assumption of a TPA. We therefore, show howmaking use of a TPA,
HybridAlpha can significantly reduce the training time of machine
learning models.
Theoretical Comparison.We now theoretically compare the crypto-
related communication steps associated with the contrasted ap-
proaches. Suppose that there are n participants andm aggregators
in the FL framework, and the threshold for decryption of Threshold-
Paillier cryptosystem is t . As shown in Table 2, In total,HybridAlpha
reducesm(n − 1) andm(2t − 1) operations compared to P-SMC and
TP-SMC solutions, respectively. This is achieved because Hybri-
dAlpha doesn’t require sending back encrypted aggregated model
updates to the participants for decryption
In the following, we also provide the details of experimental
results in §4.3. The experimental results are consistent with the
theoretical analysis.
4.2 Experimental Setup
To benchmark the performance of HybridAlpha, we train a con-
volutional neural network (CNN) with the same topology as the
one used in [38] to classify the publicly available MNIST dataset
of handwritten digits [27]. The CNN has two internal layers of
ReLU units, and a softmax layer of ten classes with cross-entropy
loss. The first layer contains 60 neurons and the second layer con-
tains 1000 neurons. The total number of parameters of this CNN is
118110. We also use the same hyperparameters reported in previous
work: a learning rate of 0.1, a batch rate of 0.01. and for differential
privacy we use a norm clipping of 4.0, and an epsilon of 0.5. We
used noise-reduction method as in [38] as differential private mech-
anism. We run experiments for 10 participants, and each participant
was randomly assigned 6,000 data points from the MNIST dataset.
For model quality, we used the pre-defined MNIST test set. Our
implementation uses Keras with a Tensorflow backend.
Cryptosystems Implementation We implement the contrasted
cryptosystems in python based on the opensource integer group
of the Charm framework [4]. Charm uses a hybrid design, where
the underlying performance-intensive mathematical operations are
implemented in native C modules, i.e., the GMP library 3, while
cryptosystems themselves can be written in a readable, high-level
language. Even though there exists Paillier implementation includ-
ing its threshold variant using other programming languages, we
re-implement them in a unified platform to allow for fair bench-
marking and to enable easy integration with python-based machine
learning frameworks such as Keras and Tensorflow.
In our implementation, we incorporated the following acceler-
ating techniques. In HybridAlpha, as presented in §2.3, the final
step of MIFE decryption is to compute the discrete logarithm of an
integer, which is a performance intensive computation. An example
would be how to compute f in h = дf , where h,д are big integers,
while f is a small integer. To accelerate the decryption, we use a
hybrid approach to solve the discrete logarithm problem. Specifi-
cally, we setup a hash table Th,д,b to store (h, f ) with a specified
д and a bound b, where −b ≤ f ≤ b, when the system initializes.
When computing discrete logarithms, the algorithm first looks up
Th,д,b to find f , where the complexity is O(1). If there is no result
inTh,д,b , the algorithm employs the traditional baby-step giant-step
algorithm [35] to compute f , where the complexity is O(n 12 ) .
The second acceleration method we implemented modifies the
encryption and decryption algorithms to allow for a one-shot en-
cryption call of a tensor. Here, each generated random nonce is
applied to the whole tensor instead of a single element. We note
that a further performance enhancement technique that could be
used is parallelizing the encryption/decryption implementation,
however, we did not include this enhancement.
Experimental Setup. All the experiments are performed on a 2
socket, 44 core (2 hyperthreads/core) Intel Xeon E5-2699 v4 platform
with 384 GB of RAM. Note that the FL framework is simulated (not
run on the real distributed environment), hence the network latency
issues are not considered in our experiment. However, we report a
comparison of data transfer by contrasted approaches.
4.3 Experimental Results
Here, we first present the benchmark result of three contrasted ap-
proaches, and then show the experimental efficiency improvement.
Impact of Floating Point Precision. The parameters of a neural
network (weights) are represented as floating point numbers. How-
ever, cryptosystems take them as input integers. Hence, the floating
point parameters should be represented and encoded into integers.
The precision number denotes the number of bits used after the
3The GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library (https://gmplib.org/).
decimal point of a floating point number. In Table 3 we present the
impact of the precision on the computation time of each crypto-
based SMC. Based on our experimental results, the precision setting
has no significant impact on operation time of each cryptosystem.
To be specific, the time cost of encryption, decryption, and other ci-
phertext computations in each cryptosystem is stable, respectively,
of length of the integer.
For encryption, the average time cost of 10 participants on 118110
gradients for HybridAlpha is around 4 seconds, while the time
cost of P-SMC and TP-SMC under the same setting is about 35
seconds. For decryption, under the same setting, the cost time of
HybridAlpha is about 30 seconds, while the time cost of P-SMC
and TP-SMC are 31 and 88 seconds, respectively. Note that the
decryption time of TP-SMC includes the share decryption by part of
participants and the final combination decryption by the aggregator,
without considering network latency of transmitting the partial
decrypted ciphertext. We can conclude that our proposed approach
has significant advantages on both encryption/decryption time cost
comparing to P-SMC and TP-SMC solutions.
Finally, the number of decimal points used in the conversion
impacts the overall accuracy of the trained model. In the remaining
of the experiments, we used 6-digits which allows for good model
and training time performance.
Impact of Number of Participants. We also measure the impact
of the number of participants on the time cost for each crypto
operation. The experimental results are shown in Table 4. We see
two different trends on the participant and on the aggregator side.
At the participant side, the encryption and decryption runtime
stays the same for all of the evaluated approaches as the number of
participants increases. In contrast, on the aggregator side, the time
cost of ciphertext multiplication increases almost linearly with the
increase in the number of participants (shown in italicized numbers
in Table 4). However, we note a significant difference between
HybridAlpha and TP-SMC. For HybridAlpha the decryption time
increases approximately linearly with the increase of participants,
while for TP-SMC, the decryption time increases exponentially as
the number of participants increases.
Focusing on the TP-SMC, we also evaluate the impact of thresh-
old t , which indicates the minimum number of participants who
are required to do partial decryption. As shown in Table 5, only
the final decryption has significant relationship with threshold t .
For the same number of participants, the cost time of decryption
increases linearly as the threshold number increase.
Model Quality, Training Time andData Transmission . In this
experiment, we evaluate the performance of HybridAlpha with re-
spect to multiple techniques to perform FL. In particular, we assess
the quality of models produced and the total training time. The
contrasted approaches for this experiment include the following
additional baselines: (i) “FL-no-privacy”, where the neural network
is trained without privacy considerations. This method provides
a baseline for maximum possible performance in terms of model
quality; (ii) “Local DP”, where each participant applies differen-
tial privacy locally according to [24]; (iii) for “TP-SMC”, “P-SMC”
and “HybridAlpha”, we report the results for two cases: adding
differential privacy to protect privacy of the output and without
adding differential privacy. When no differential privacy is added,
we use “TP-SMC no DP”, “P-SMC no DP” and “HybridAlpha no
DP”. For privacy-preserving approaches we use an ϵ = 0.5. Finally,
our experiments used t = 5 for HybridAlpha and TP-SMC. This
experiment was run with 10 participants.
To measure quality of model performance, we report the F1-
score (a measure that combines precision and recall) of the resulting
models. The results are presented in Figure 3(a).
We see different trends depending on whether a particular ap-
proach protects privacy of the computation and of the output. As
expected, approaches that do not protect the privacy of the final
model - those that don’t inject differential privacy noise- result in a
in higher F1-score. In contrast, “Local DP” provides the lowest F1-
score due to the high amount of noise injected by each participant.
For approaches that use SMC to uniquely protect the privacy of the
computation, “TP-SMC no DP”, “P-SMC no DP” and “HybridAlpha
no DP”, we see higher F1-scores than for those that protect the
privacy of the output. This shows the price of protecting against
the risk of inference on the model. Finally, we see that approaches
that combine differential privacy with SMC are capable of achiev-
ing higher F1-scores while protecting the privacy of the input and
output.
We now analyze these approaches from the perspective of to-
tal training time presented in Figure 3(b). As it can be seen, our
proposed HybridAlpha has very similar training time to “FL-no-
privacy”. In other words, the training time added by ensuring pri-
vacy of the input and output is negligent. In contrast, we see that
the slowest approach is TP-SMC even though we set up t to a con-
servative 50% of the entire number of participants in the system.
This result is due to the fact that TP-SMC requires more rounds of
communication per global step. The high training time makes TP-
SMC suitable for models that require limited number of interactions
with the aggregator during training.
Beside the efficiency in training time, we also evaluate the ef-
ficiency of network transmission by measuring the volume of en-
crypted parameters transmitted over the network. In Figure 4, we
present the total transmitted cipertext size under different crypto-
based SMC approaches for one epoch. The green bar represents
initial ciphertext size of model parameters, while the spotted orange
bar indicates the size of subsequent ciphertext, including multiplied
cipher, and partially decrypted ciphers. We can see that HybridAl-
pha provides the lowest transmission rate because it only performs
one round of communication on encrypted data without any sub-
sequent ciphertext transmission. Also, our proposed approach has
smaller ciphertext size of initial parameters compared to contrasted
approaches.
5 SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
We analyze the security and privacy of our proposed framework
from three different perspectives: security offered by MIFE scheme,
privacy guarantees of the framework, and prevention for different
types of inference attacks.
5.1 Security of the Cryptographic Approach
The security of MIFE is critical to HybridAlpha, since it is the under-
lying infrastructure of SMC protocol that supports secure aggrega-
tion in HybridAlpha. In our adoption of MIFE, we add a public key
distribution algorithm run by the TPA as a beneficial supplement
Table 3: The impact of precision on computation time (s) of three SMC approaches.
TP-SMC ▷ P-SMC HybridAlpha
precision encavg ctfuse decshare,avg deccombine encavg ctfuse dec encavg dec
2 35.120 2.586 61.080 28.465 35.752 2.269 32.042 4.157 30.075
3 35.675 2.604 61.929 28.202 35.725 2.369 31.574 4.158 30.512
4 35.841 2.571 60.832 28.324 35.821 2.387 31.856 4.110 29.865
5 35.767 2.635 60.369 28.816 35.857 2.493 31.625 4.075 30.149
6 35.724 2.578 60.326 28.286 35.985 2.532 31.587 4.095 30.803
▷ The threshold parameter of Threshold-Paillier encryption system is set to half the number of
participants.
Table 4: The impact of participant # on computation time (s) of three SMC approaches.
TP-SMC ▷ P-SMC HybridAlpha
participants encavg ctfuse decshare,avg deccombine encavg ctfuse dec encavg dec
6 35.968 1.375 60.555 22.184 35.934 1.332 31.616 4.241 20.246
8 35.375 1.843 60.820 23.980 36.039 1.859 31.611 4.092 25.349
10 35.693 2.358 60.988 28.401 36.847 2.611 32.197 4.077 31.782
12 35.685 2.759 60.947 34.684 36.142 2.959 31.588 4.091 36.884
14 35.688 3.215 60.965 39.838 35.932 3.330 31.503 4.126 42.683
16 35.721 3.694 60.917 46.849 36.533 4.481 32.020 4.059 47.435
18 35.683 4.170 60.879 53.441 36.628 5.368 32.996 4.594 56.519
20 35.697 4.764 60.816 97.224 36.743 5.765 31.923 4.147 59.823
▷ The threshold parameter of TP-SMC is set to half the number of participants.
(a) F1 score of different approaches as epoch increases (b) training time of different approaches as epoch increases
Figure 3: Model quality and time efficiency comparison for multiple FL approaches.
of the original MIFE scheme proposed in [2] to make it applicable
to our FL framework.
Specifically, the additional algorithm is only responsible for dis-
tributing each participant’s respective unique public key pki . Un-
like the original design of encryption algorithms where each par-
ticipant encrypts the data using the master secret key msk, our
encryption algorithm uses pki that is derived from the master
keysmpk andmsk. However, the core method in the encryption
algorithm remains intact, and our design has no impact on other al-
gorithms, e.g., SKGenerate, Decrypt. As a consequence, our adoption
of MIFE does not change the security construction in the original
MIFE scheme in [2]. It is then as secure as proved in [2]. To avoid
redundancy, we do not present the correctness and security proofs
to MIFE here, and readers can refer to [2] for more details.
5.2 Privacy of FL Framework
Our proposed FL framework can ensure the privacy of the output
model and the aggregation computation.
5.2.1 Privacy of the Output Model. We provide ϵ-differential pri-
vacy guarantee via existing methods presented in previous works,
Table 5: Impact of threshold t for TP-SMC on computation
time (s).
threshold† encavg ctfuse decshare,avg deccombine
2 35.577 2.602 60.736 12.700
4 35.697 2.592 60.420 23.293
6 35.713 2.625 60.238 34.427
8 36.054 2.623 60.767 46.462
10 35.880 2.626 60.650 58.293
† The total participants number is set to 10 and the
precision number is set to 6.
Figure 4: Total transmitted ciphertext size of different ap-
proaches for one epoch.
e.g., [1, 32, 38]. These papers have shown via theoretical analysis
and experimental results that such a mechanism can achieve target
privacy along with acceptable performance for the final trained
model. As a consequence, our proposed framework can also achieve
the same privacy guarantee for the output model as demonstrated
in [32, 38].
5.2.2 Privacy of Computation. We exploit multi-input functional
encryption as the underlying infrastructure for SMC protocol to
compute the average of the weights of the participants’ local trained
models. As stated in §5.1, the MIFE scheme is secure so that any
plaintext under its protection cannot be compromised by malicious
attackers. The MIFE scheme also guarantees that the decryptor, the
aggregator in our FL framework, can only acquire the function re-
sults, i.e., the average weight, but not the original data, i.e., weights
of the participants’ local models.
5.2.3 Inference Attack Prevention. Next, we consider inference at-
tacks for two adversaries: (i) a curious aggregator, and (ii) malicious
or colluding participants.
In §3.2.2, we have shown that a curious aggregator can launch
an inference attack targeting a specific participant by manipulating
the weighted vector wp and subsequently requesting the function
private key. To prevent such inference attacks, we add an addi-
tional module in TPA to filter requests for weighted vectors that
are maliciously defined to isolate the reply of a single participant.
Algorithm 2 verifies that at least t replies are used for aggregation,
because there are at least t > (n/2) + 1 non-colluding parties; even
if the aggregator colludes with dishonest participants he cannot
isolate the reply of a target participant.
Even if an adversary manages to collect other participants’ en-
crypted data for a possible brute-force attack, this attack is not
successful. In particular, suppose that there exits a malicious partic-
ipant P′i with its own public key pkP′i , collected encrypted data
c j = EncpkPj, j,i (mj ) from Pj , and its own original data setS
′ . Here
mj is the corresponding plaintext of c j , andmj and anym
′ ∈ S′
belong to a same integer group. The semantic security of the under-
lying MIFE scheme in our SMC protocol ensures that the adversary
P′j does not have a non-negligible advantage to infer the original
datamj compared to the random guess. Furthermore, as we assume
the existence of at least t honest participants where each participant
does not share the same public key for encryption, the colluding
participants cannot infer/identify private information using the
output of the aggregator with their local models.
Note that based on the threat model defined in §3.1, we do not
consider the DDoS attack on the aggregator where a malicious ag-
gregator or a outside attacker will interrupt the network or replace
a valid update from an honest participant.
6 RELATEDWORK
Federated learning was proposed in [25, 28] to jointly learn a global
model without sharing their data. Although this provides a basic
privacy guarantee because privacy-sensitive data is not transmitted,
it still suffers from inference attacks that use the final model or the
model updates exchanged during the FL training to infer private
information; examples of such attacks include [19, 29, 30, 37].
To thwart inference attacks, previous work has proposed to add
differential privacy during the learning process e.g., [1]. However,
directly applying such approaches in the FL setting results in poor
model performance because each party trains its own model. For
this reason, new approaches tailored to FL have been proposed.
Table 1 shows the threat model of existing approaches and the
privacy guarantees they provide. Solutions proposed in [31, 36] rely
on trusted aggregators and honest participants. PATE [31] proposes
a “teacher-student” architecture where teachers train their models
over their local datasets. Subsequently, a fully trusted aggregator is
used to build a collective model. All these approaches differ from
HybridAlpha in that they rely on a trusted aggregator.
A number of approaches propose to use SMC [6, 34, 38]. Among
them, different SMC protocols are used to aggregate the global
model (see Table 1). PySyft [34] employs the SPDZ protocol [12, 13].
Truex et al. [38] uses a threshold-based partially additive homomor-
phic encryption [11]. Bonawitz et al. [6] makes use of secret sharing
that enables authenticated encryption. These approaches [6, 34, 38]
also prevent or can be extended to prevent inference attacks on
the final model by adding differential privacy. The main advantage
HybridAlpha has over these approaches is the communication effi-
ciency (see Table 1). While existing approaches need more than one
round of communication between the aggregator and participants
(excluding the key setup phase), HybridAlpha only incurs a single
round. Hence HybridAlpha can be used to train machine learning
models faster as demonstrated in the experimental section.
Most of the existing federated learning frameworks only work
on the scenario of horizontally partitioned data. To tackle the issues
and challenges in the case of vertically partitioned data, several
methods are proposed in [9, 14, 22], which focus on entity resolution
and simple machine learning models, like logistic regression. Such
vertically partitioned data cases beyond the research scope in this
paper, and will be deferred to future work.
7 CONCLUSION
Federated learning promises to address privacy concerns and regu-
latory compliance such as for GDPR [39] and HIPAA [3]. However,
extant approaches addressing privacy concerns in federated learn-
ing provide strong privacy guarantees and goodmodel performance
at the cost of higher training time and high network transmission.
We propose HybridAlpha, a novel federated learning framework
to address these issues. Our theoretical and experimental analysis
shows that, compared to existing techniques, on average, HybridAl-
pha can reduce the training time by 68% and data transfer volume
by 92% without sacrificing privacy guarantees or model perfor-
mance. Using HybridAlpha, federated learning with strong privacy
guarantees can be applied to use cases sensitive to training time
and communication overhead, in particular for models with a large
number of parameters.
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